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The financing decisions and capital structure of internet companies are analyzed and 
observed findings are related to the common capital structure theories. Large internet 
companies usually have low debt and small internet companies have high debt. It was 
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behavior. A number of recommendations for capital structure theory and practice is 
suggested.  
 
1. Introduction 
The modern theory of capital structure began with the famous proposition of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) that described the conditions of capital structure 
irrelevance.  Since then, many theories of capital structure have been developed 
including trade off theory, pecking order theory, agency cost theory, life cycle theory 
and flexibility theory. After so many innovations, capital structure remains one of the 
most controversial and debatable issue in corporate finance. 
The key issues are as follows. First, an immense gap exists between theories and 
practice. Graham and Harvey (2001) found that less than 50% of theoretical ideas find 
some support among managers. Second, there are big differences in the researchers’ 
opinion. For example, Chirinko and Singha (2000), Leary and Roberts (2010) and Frank 
and Goyal (2003) claim that trade-off theory drives capital structure decisions while 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Lemmon and Zender (2010) claim that pecking-
order theory drives capital structure. Third, there is difference among opinions about 
the direction that future work on capital structure should take. For instance, Harris and 
Raviv (1991) argue that asymmetric information theories of capital structure are not 
promising. However, the stream of research related to asymmetric information has not 
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stopped since then.1 Furthermore, the financial crisis during 2008 and 2009 showed 
that corporate managers appeared to lack an understanding of the role of asymmetric 
information. The market for mortgage-backed securities, which many believe was at 
the core of financial crisis, involved asymmetric information between investors and 
issuers. Various scandals, such as the one involving Bernie Madoff, illustrate the depth 
of asymmetric information problems between firms’ insiders and investors.  
   The present paper attempts to analyze issues described above. The current 
practices of 71 companies including 29 large companies and 42 small companies were 
analyzed and compared to existing theories.2  The size of the companies is from 40 
million to 223.48 billion.  With the help of spreadsheet analysis an optimal capital 
structure for a given company was first found. Spreadsheet analysis is mostly based on 
the trade-off between tax advantages of debt and increasing risk from debt financing. 
This analysis implies that large companies in the Internet industry are underleveraged.  
For example, for Google Inc., the optimal debt ratio is 16.2% and the current debt ratio 
is just 8.8%.  It was also found that most small companies in the Internet industry are 
overleveraged.  For example, the optimal debt ratio for Ediets.Com Inc is 0%, but the 
current debt ratio is as high as 59.54%.   
   Other factors that have not been taken into consideration in the spreadsheet 
analysis are then described, which affect managers’ decisions on company’s capital 
structure. It was found that no single theory of capital structure can explain the observed 
patterns of capital structure in internet industry. The trade-off theory of capital structure 
is unable to accurately explain why only a small fraction of firms that are increasingly 
profitable utilize debt as a source of financing. Spreadsheet analysis shows that firm’s 
current capital structures are distant from their optimal.  It was also found that the 
pecking order theory’s prioritization of sources of financing is only maintained in 
certain situations. For example, it would appear that firms who undergo high-growth 
periods with net losses do not utilize public debt before equity financing. Most 
                                                             
1See, for example, Klein (2002) and Miglo (2010a, 2011).  
2See Appendix 1. 
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companies issued equity through an initial public offering before utilizing debt which 
opposes what is expected from the pecking order theory. The market timing theory 
pays tribute to some actions taken by nearly every firm in our sample. For example, 
nearly all companies issue equity through public offerings at opportune times, most 
notably during the “tech craze” or “dot.com bubble” of the late 1990s. Also it appears 
that firms undergo public offerings when the market has recovered from the tech crash 
of 2000 or at other times when management feels their stock is overvalued. Companies 
make stock repurchases at windows of opportunities where they believe their stock is 
undervalued. However, from a broader point of view, the market timing theory is limited 
in explaining firm’s capital structure besides IPO decision.  
    Flexibility is largely unexplored area of capital structure that can explain many 
patterns of capital structure for internet industries. Both equity and debt holders do place 
value on flexibility, especially in the recent years of turmoil in capital markets. Internet 
companies seem to put an especial emphasis on flexibility when managing their capital 
structures given the innovative nature of their industry.  
    There is a “home bias” in capital structure for most companies in our sample. 
Internet companies can use international financing more efficiently. Some reasons for 
that include the availability of lower interest rates, flexible regulation for dynamic 
companies, no capitalization restrictions, reducing interest rate risk by using flexible 
interest rates in markets which have low correlation between each other, using modern 
financing arrangements like international project financing or non-recourse debt to 
mitigate agency problems.   
    It was found that small internet companies have high debt/equity ratios. This 
finding is related to recent line of research about the usage of debt by small companies 
(Robb and Robinson (2012), Cole and Sokolyk (2014) and Miglo (2014)). Using a lot 
of debt by small companies is inconsistent with almost any existing theory of capital 
structure. Some authors argue that recent findings about the importance of debt for 
small companies are opposite to common opinion that small businesses and especially 
start-ups rely heavily on internal finance including owner's equity or funds from 
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relatives and friends.3 
    Credit rating concerns are unexplored area of capital structure theory. The capital 
structure management of large internet companies is strongly consistent with the view 
that managers are deeply concerned about ratings.  
     With regard to existing theories, the analysis revealed that any single theory has 
major problems in explaining capital structure management of internet companies. It 
suggests that a unified approach should be developed in near future. In addition, the 
opinion of Harris and Raviv (1991) that asymmetric information theories are less 
promising seems to be questionable. It would appear that asymmetric information is 
important in explaining many patterns of capital structure behavior but managers do not 
have a practical tool to use it more efficiently. At the same time given that the gap 
between theory and practice is very large, the same as Harris and Raviv (1991) in that 
the door is still widely open for new theory of capital structure which can be helpful to 
make a bridge between theory and practice of capital structure.      
     The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes internet industry. 
Section 3 presents a review of capital structure theories. Section 4 describes in details 
the analytical method used in the paper and the spreadsheet used to analyze firm’s 
capital structure. Section 5 provides detailed examples of some firms capital structure 
analysis. Section 6 presents the results of firm’s capital structure analysis and the 
conclusion is drawn in Section 7. 
 
2. The internet industry 
The internet started out as an American military project in the 1950-60s and has 
evolved into a modern mainstream phenomenon. It is used by common businesses  for  
marketing  and  sales,  for  searching  and  sharing  of  files (including 
documents, audio and video files) by businesses and households, and  it  is  even  
used  to  facilitate  online  communities  with  forums  and “blogging” with 
popular websites such as Facebook, Twitter and Youtube. The Internet has 
                                                             
3 See, for example, Robb and Robinson (2012). 
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revolutionized the computer and communications world like nothing before. The 
Internet is at once a world-wide broadcasting capability, a mechanism for information 
dissemination, and a medium for collaboration and interaction between individuals and 
their computers without regard for geographic location. The Internet represents one of 
the most successful examples of the benefits of sustained investment and commitment 
to research and development of information infrastructure. Beginning with the early 
research in packet switching, the government, industry and academia have been 
partners in evolving and deploying this exciting new technology.  
In the technology industry, one kind of the companies is pretty famous which is 
called information provider companies. It may sound unfamiliar for most people. 
However, most people are familiar with Internet search engine companies like 
worldwide Google, Yahoo, Baidu and so on. Many people probably depend on these 
internet search engine companies when they use internet to search. These internet 
search engine companies are also called information provider companies which provide 
different information to various customers. For instance, the famous search engine 
company Google can provide a tool to help customers to acquire wanted information. 
However, different information providers can provide different types of information. 
Like Youku, a video sharing website, can provide all types of videos information.  
With the development of the industry, new information provider companies like 
Facebook and LinkedIn can help people to establish connection and share information 
with others. In the information provider industry, companies provide information in 
different ways, but the basic concept is to provide the needed information to customers.  
In the Internet industry, the leader companies and the laggards have the big 
difference in Market Cap, long term debt to equity, P/E, net profit margin and other 
aspects. For instance, the leader companies, Google, Yahoo and Baidu, have the market 
cap of $272.1B, $321.9B and $380.4B. On the contrary, some small companies like, 
VRX Worldwide, Inc, Armada Data Corp, Alphinat Inc. have relatively small market 
cap of $1.0 M, $1.8M and $1.9M. P/E is also very different among different companies. 
For instance, Facebook that held its initial public offering (IPO) on May 18, 2012, has 
a P/E of 1805.33. Google has its P/E ratio of 25.62. Most of the big companies have 
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high net profit margin. For instance, Google has the net profit margin of 20%, and 
Yahoo has the similar net profit margin of 20.23%. Compared to Google and Yahoo, 
Baidu has the highest net profit margin of 44.12%. Small companies have the various 
net profit margin some companies have relatively high net profit margin. Atrinsic, Inc. 
has a market cap of $0.13M and has a net profit margin of -36.7%. eMedia 
Networks also has a relatively small market cap of $0.4M. However, it has a quite 
different net profit margin of 11.59 compared with Atrinsic, Inc -36.7%. 
 
3. Capital structure theories 
This section describes capital structure theories. It will discuss some challenges 
faced by each theory that provides a basic for further discussions about existing 
practices in capital structure theory and management.4  
3.1. Trade-off theory 
      In contrast to dividends, interest paid on debt reduces the firm’s taxable income. 
Debt also increases the probability of bankruptcy. Trade-off theory suggests that capital 
structure reflects a trade-off between the tax benefits of debt and the expected costs of 
bankruptcy (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973). Miglo (2010) suggests a model where 
optimal debt level is given by the following:  
                              𝐷𝐷 = 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅�
𝑇𝑇+𝑘𝑘
                          (1) 
Here R   stands for maximal earnings,  T   is corporate tax rate and k measures 
bankruptcy costs.  
If k  is higher in (1), the equilibrium level of D  should be lower. As the 
expected bankruptcy costs increase, the advantages of using equity also increase. This 
result has several interpretations. Large firms should have more debt because they are 
more diversified and have lower default risk. Tangible assets suffer a smaller loss of 
value when firms go into distress. Hence, firms with more tangible assets should have 
higher leverage compared to those that have more intangible assets, such as research 
                                                             
4For a more detailed review of capital structure theory see, for instance, Miglo (2010b). 
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firms. Growth firms tend to lose more of their value than non-growth firms when they 
go into distress. Thus, theory predicts a negative relationship between leverage and 
growth.  
When T  increases in Equation 1, debt should also increase because higher 
taxes lead to a greater tax advantage of using debt. Hence, firms with higher tax rates 
should have higher debt ratios compared to firms with lower tax rates. Inversely, firms 
that have substantial non-debt tax shields such as depreciation should be less likely to 
use debt than firms that do not have these tax shields. If tax rates increase over time, 
debt ratios should also increase. Debt ratios in countries where debt has a much larger 
tax benefit should be higher than debt ratios in countries whose debt has a lower tax 
benefit.  
 As suggested in (1), if R   increases, D   should also increase. Thus, more 
profitable firms should have more debt. Expected bankruptcy costs are lower and 
interest tax shields are more valuable for profitable firms.  
   Although trade-off theory predicts that the marginal tax benefit of debt should be 
equal to the marginal expected bankruptcy cost, the empirical evidence is mixed. Some 
researchers argue that the former is greater than the latter because direct bankruptcy 
costs are small and the level of debt is below optimal (Graham, 2000). Others find that 
indirect bankruptcy costs can total as much as 25 percent to 30 percent of assets value 
and are thus comparable with tax benefits of debt (Molina, 2005; Almeida and 
Philippon, 2007). Additionally, including personal taxation in the basic model can 
reduce the tax advantage of debt (Green and Hollifield, 2003; Gordon and Lee, 2007) 
because tax rates on the return from equity such as dividends or capital gain are often 
reduced. 
Trade-off theory of capital structure is a foundation of spreadsheet analysis 
described in Section 4. The spreadsheet analysis takes into account taxes and also 
increasing risk from debt financing.  
3.2. Other theories of capital structure  
3.2.1. Pecking-order theory. 
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 The key element of pecking-order theory is asymmetric information between firm’s 
insiders and outsiders. Information asymmetries exist in almost every facet of corporate 
finance and complicate managers’ ability to maximize firm values. Managers of good 
quality firms face the challenge of directly convincing investors about the true quality 
of their firm especially if this concerns future performance. As a result, investors try to 
incorporate indirect evidence in their valuation of firm performance by analyzing 
information-revealing actions including capital structure choice. 
 Myers and Majluf (1984) set forth pecking order theory. Equity is dominated by 
internal funds in pecking order theory. Low-quality firms use equity as much as internal 
funds but high-quality firms prefer internal funds because shares issued by the company 
can only be sold with discount (i.e. below their true value) because of imperfect 
information problems. Similarly debt dominates equity. Debt suffers from miss 
valuation less than equity. The same holds if the firm has available assets-in-place. 
Hence a “pecking order” emerges: internal funds, debt, and equity (Myers and Majluf, 
1984). 
    Good-quality firms tend to use internal funds for financing as much as possible. 
Because low-quality firms do not have as much profits and retained earnings as high-
quality firms, they use external sources, usually debt, more frequently. This helps to 
explain the described above puzzle about the negative correlation between debt and 
profitability. 
   Also pecking order theory predicts that a higher extent of asymmetric information 
reduces the incentive to issue equity.  
3.2.2 Signaling                 
     In the pecking order model, good quality firms have to use internal funds to avoid 
adverse selection problems and losing value. These firms cannot signal their quality by 
changing their capital structure. In signaling theory capital structure serves as a signal 
of private information (Ross, 1977). If a separating equilibrium exists, high-quality 
firms issue debt and low-quality firms issue equity. The empirical prediction is that firm 
value (or profitability) and the debt-to-equity ratio is positively related. The evidence, 
however, is ambiguous. Most empirical studies report a negative relationship between 
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leverage and profitability as discussed earlier. In a similar spirit, some studies document 
the superior absolute performance of equity-issuing firms before and immediately after 
the issue (Jain and Kini, 1994; Loughran and Ritter, 1997). Several studies examine 
long-term firm performance following capital structure changes. Shah (1994) reports 
that business risk falls after leverage-increasing exchange offers but rises after leverage-
decreasing exchange offers. Jain and Kini (1994), Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah (1997), 
and Loughran and Ritter (1997) document the long-run operating underperformance of 
equity issuing firms compared to non-issuing firms. 
3.2.3. Agency cost-based theories of capital structure  
 Agency costs arise because managers do not necessarily act in the best interests of 
shareholders who also may not act in the best interests of creditors. Including agency 
costs in the basic model can help to explain some problems of trade-off theory discussed 
above such as debt conservatism.  
If an investment yields large returns, equity holders capture most of the gains. If, 
however, the investment fails, debt holders bear the consequences. As a result, equity 
holders may benefit from investing in highly risky projects, even if the projects are 
value decreasing. Jensen and Meckling (1976) call this the “asset substitution effect.” 
Debt holders can correctly anticipate equity holders’ future behavior. This leads to a 
decrease in the value of debt and reduces the incentive to issue debt. Myers (1977) 
observes that when firms are likely to go bankrupt in the near future, equity holders 
may have no incentive to contribute new capital to invest in value-increasing projects. 
Equity holders bear the entire cost of the investment, but the returns from the investment 
may be captured mainly by the debt holders (“debt overhang”).   
 On the other hand, some agency theories favor higher debt. For example, Jensen 
(1986) argues that debt improves the discipline of an entrenched manager (so called 
“debt and discipline” theory).  
3.2.4. Flexibility theory of capital structure and life cycle theory of capital structure. 
Firms in the development stage have little favorable track record (i.e., credit 
ratings) of borrowing (Diamond, 1991) and are most likely to be turned down for credit 
when they need it the most. Thus, firms in the development stage that have little 
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financial flexibility will abstain from issuing risky debt and will instead issue equity. 
Firms in the maturity stage begin generating positive earnings and have more financial 
flexibility than developing firms. Accordingly, these firms rely more on debt financing 
to fund their investments as they face less financing constraints and as they expect to 
repay their debt with growing future earnings.  
    Flexibility theory finds some support in empirical studies (Byoun, 2008) and 
managers’ surveys (Graham and Harvey, 2001). This theory helps to explain why small 
and risky firms issue equity and why these firms do not follow pecking-order theory. 
Gamba and Triantis (2008) develop a theoretical model that analyzes optimal capital 
structure policy for a firm that values flexibility in the presence of personal taxes and 
transaction costs. The importance of financial flexibility as compared to major theories 
of capital structure remains an open question. More work that compares flexibility 
theory with other theories is expected. Also it was noted that many young firms 
especially venture firms do not issue common equity but rather convertible preferred 
equity which resembles debt more than equity.  
     Life cycle theory of capital structure argues that besides financial flexibility there 
are other factors which can explain financing patterns of firms in different stages of 
their development (Damodaran, 2003). Start-up firms do not have much profit, so the 
tax advantage of debt is not as important as for a mature firm. The start-up firms do not 
require incentives for managers since there is no large separation between ownership 
and management like in the case of big public corporations. This leads to the idea that 
mature firms value debt more compared to start-up firms. To what extent the life cycle 
theory represents a separate theory of capital structure rather than a combination of 
arguments from other theories remains an open question.     
 
4. Method of research. 
    The choice of case study approach is motivated by the following. First, there are a 
number of researchers calling for more case studies in capital structure management 
(Graham and Harvey, 2001). Second, case study is an effective way of research in areas 
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which include several layers of analysis and different approaches and theories. Section 
3 suggests that capital structure management represents such an area. There is a lot of 
competing theories of capital structure. Furthermore one of our main objectives is to 
find firms’ optimal capital structure policies (as opposite to existing policies). Some of 
the theories are better formalized and make it more simple for managers to use in real 
life situations (such as trade-off theory) while others are far from that (such as 
asymmetric information). The case study is simply the best research strategy because 
the problem under study is to reach understanding in a complex context (Singleton, 
Straits, and Straits (1993), Mertens (1998)). Campbell (1989) advocates a case study 
design for investigating real-life events, including organizational and managerial 
processes. Third, available sample for capital structure management analysis of large 
companies is small so our sample covers a good fraction of firms.  
Companies’ capital structure was analyzed using the following questions (see Miglo 
(2012a) for more details).  
1.  What is the firm’s current debt/equity ratio? 
2.  Is the firm’s debt/equity ratio low or high compared with other firms at the same 
industry or related industries? 
3.  Is the firm’s current debt/equity ratio explained by the firm’s financial policy or by 
the current market conditions?  
4.  What is the firm’s optimal capital structure according to WACC (weighted average 
cost of capital) approach? 
5.  If current debt/equity ratio different from optimal, then what factors, which are not 
taken into consideration in the spreadsheet analysis may explain this difference? 
When working on above questions the spreadsheet analysis was used along with 
capital structure theories. These theories are Pecking-Order Theory, Trade-Off Theory, 
Agency Cost, Flexibility and some others described in previous chapter.  
Questions 1, 2 and 4 deal with financial calculations. By doing so, the company’s 
Debt/Equity Ratio and its WACC can be found. WACC is the expected return on all of 
a company’s securities. It is calculated by multiplying the cost of each capital 
component by its proportional weight and then summing: 
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WACC= (E/V)rE+ (D/V)rD(1-TC) 
    Here D and E are the market value of the firm’s debt and equity, V=D+E is the 
firm’s total market value, rD and rE are the cost of debt and equity, and TC is the marginal 
corporate tax rate. Tax is also taken into consideration, since interest paid on a firm’s 
borrowing can be deducted from taxable income, which is the so called tax benefit. 
   To get the optimal capital structure, D/(D+E) ratio changes from 0% to 100% as 
hypotheses, and several financial parameters for different ratios are calculated. Then 
we find one that has minimal WACC and respectively maximal market value for the 
firm.  
     More specifically, first β is calculated 
β=[1+(1- TC)D/E] β05 
Then, rE and rD  are calculated by the following equations: 
rE=Current Short Term Government Rate + β×Risk Premium 
rD=Risk-Free Interest + Default Premium6 
Then, the WACC is calculated based on the equation above; all the WACC for 
different D/(D+E) ratios are listed; and finally the minimum WACC from the list which 
corresponds to the optimal capital structure is found. 
   With regard to question 3, the firm’s debt/equity ratio over the last few years is 
helpful. For example, the Oracle’s D/E ratio was growing from 2005 to 2008. With a 
further study, a part of the reason for the growing D/E ratio is Oracle’s financial policy, 
when the company aggressively purchased several competitors during that period and 
accumulated a large amount of debt.  
As to question 5, the optimal debt/equity ratio (based on spreadsheet analysis) of 
eBay’s is significantly higher than its current ratio. It appears that this happened because 
high bankruptcy cost of the industry and the needs for flexibility for future financing 
are not taken into consideration in the WACC approach. We hold the view of that eBay 
has invested so much money, time, and effort to develop specific products, that the 
                                                             
5 This is Ito formula. β0 refers to the “unlevered” beta of the company. 
6 Default premium depends on the company’s  credit rating that ranges from  AAA to D. It depends 
in turn on such parameters as interest coverage ratio.  
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consequence can be very serious if it fails due to a large amount of debt. The primary 
reason is the company’s large proportion of intellectual property which cannot be 
quickly converted to cash in a financial distress situation. Moreover, the e-commerce 
industry is still in its growth stage, the future financing requirements of the industry are 
unknown, therefore issuing stocks to finance today’s capital needs leaves firms with 
more flexibility for future financing than borrowing money. 
It was also found that the agency cost for Microsoft is relatively low, and this can 
be explained by pointing out that the biggest shareholder of Microsoft – Bill Gates – 
has been deeply involved in company’s management. When there are fewer conflicts 
between managers and shareholders, there would be less agency cost. 
   An excel file was used that is divided into following parts7: Inputs, Operating lease 
information, Debt, Tax rate, and Calculations. Inputs part has three components, 
financial information, market information, and general market data. Financial 
information includes earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation (EBITDA) and 
depreciation and amortization. Market information includes number of shares 
outstanding, market price per share, Beta of the company. Current long-term 
government bond rate, short-term interest rate, risk premium, and country default 
spread are in the general market data.  
     Operating lease expenses are really financial expenses, and should be treated as 
such. Accounting standards allow them to be treated as operating expenses. In this part, 
the commitments to make operating leases are converted into debt and the operating 
income is adjusted accordingly, by adding back the imputed interest expense on this 
debt. 
     In the debt part, each company’s book value and market value of debt were found. 
In each kind of value, companies’ bank medium-term debt, bank long-term debt, bonds, 
unsecured debentures and notes, senior debt securities, senior medium-term notes, 
subordinated medium-term notes, and other notes are taken into the consideration. Then, 
based on firms’ income statement, we find their earnings before tax and provision for 
                                                             
7 For more details, see Appendix 2-6. 
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taxes in the recent three years. Then the average tax rates in three years are calculated. 
      The calculation part includes the following parts: 
1. Input data; 
2. Interest coverage ratios, rating of debt, default spreads, interest rates and 
probabilities of default. 
3. Current situation; 
4. Capital structure and cost of capital calculation; 
5. Main results. 
Most data about the company (earnings, expenditures, depreciation etc.) were 
found from yahoo finance (http://finance.yahoo.com/) and edumarketinsight website 
(educational version of Standard and Poors data base) for which we had passwords 
provided together with textbooks (usually it was “Principles of corporate finance” by 
Brealey and Myers). Default spreads, risk premiums and other information for point 2 
could be found on bondsonline website or on Federal Reserve website.8 Points 3-5 
represent calculations. 
     Finally, several ratios were calculated such as D/(D+E) ratio, Beta of the firm, 
cost of equity, cost of debt, WACC, market value of firm, and market price/share.  
5. Examples of company capital structure analysis  
     Companies are divided into two groups, the large companies and the small 
companies. The large companies are market cap larger than 1 billion dollars (for 
example Google and Yahoo), and the small companies are market cap smaller than 1 
billion dollars (for example Move and Look Smart). This section presents the analysis 
of these companies. The following tables show calculation results. 
5.1. Google  
Table 1. Results from Google Analysis 2013 
 Current Capital 
Structure 
Optimal Capital 
Structure 
Change 
D/(D+E) Ratio 4.02% 10.01% 5.99% 
                                                             
8 http://www.bondsonline.com/Todays_Market/Corporate_Bond_Spreads.php and 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm 
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Beta for the Stock 1.03 1.07 0.04 
Cost of Equity 10.06% 10.51% 0.45% 
Cost of Debt 2.47% 2.47% 0.00% 
WACC 9.76% 9.70% -0.06% 
Firm Value (mln.) 273458 274988  1,530 
Value/share  797 801 4.00 
 
Google is a success story. Google’s mission is to organize the world’s information and 
make it universally accessible and useful for generations to come. Google has a vision 
of expanding their resources while keeping its edge in the market. The acquisitions of 
related newborns and continuous launches of diverse and unique products indicate its 
push for growth and profitability while utilizing all the available resources possible. 
Google started its journey back in 1995 with having a garage office and ended up 
announcing Initial Public Offering of 19,605,052 shares of Class A common stock that 
took place on Wall Street on August 18, 2004 which was highly awaited decision for 
public and as a result, the company’s liquidity increased.  On December 31, 2004, 
Google had $2,132.3 million of cash, cash equivalents and marketable securities, 
compared to $334.7 million and $146.3 million at the year-ends of 2003 and 2002 
respectively. Since this time Google has mainly held on to these additional cash flows 
holding over $3.5 billion in cash and cash equivalents in 2005 and 2006 to the date 
when Google shares jumped to an all-time high above $1,000 after the search engine 
giant reported a surge in mobile and video advertising that helped drive quarterly 
revenue up 23 percent in 2013.  
Capital structure  
Google uses more equity financing rather than debt financing as it evolved from 
introductory to growing stage over the years. Google changed its debt/assets ratio from 
4.7% to 8.4% during 2010 and 2012 and now back to the 4.02% in 2013 (see Table 1). 
Google’s cash flow and profit are so strong that they can finance the business with 
retained earnings.  
    Trade off theory states that the capital structure is the result of a trade-off between 
the tax advantage of debt and higher risk and bankruptcy costs resulting from debt 
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financing. Spreadsheet analysis suggests that Google’s optimal debt ratio is 10.01%, 
however, its current debt ratio is 4.02%.  
The pecking order theory implies that the company should use internal funds before 
using debt and equity and should use external debt before external equity. Google uses 
internal funds and equity but not debt which means Google considered going for IPO 
before debt which contradicts the pecking order theory. Second, this theory implies 
negative correlation between debt and profitability which is true as Google is making 
profit although not using a lot of debt. At the time of IPO, Google had enough profits 
to keep its operation running but still, rather taking more debt, Google decided to gather 
funds through equity. The reasons for Google to go public were these in accordance 
with “Letter from the Founders,” published in 2010. It follows from that document that 
Google could restructure to get back below 500 shareholders (meaning, essentially, find 
a way to buy back shares from our employees) or it could continue to be a private 
company but at the same time live with having to report its financial results like any 
public company or it could go public. The latter will help to create a market for firm 
shares including shares belonging to employees.  
    On one hand, the agency cost theory favors low debt implying low bankruptcy 
cost and high level of confidence for investors. This is consistent with Google’s policies. 
On the other hand, the agency cost theory states higher debt is good for a company 
because it can stimulate manager to perform better. This part is not consistent with 
Google case. In Google’s case, the conflict between shareholders and managers has low 
importance as the company is very profitable. In the long term the things may change. 
An important indicator of potential conflict between shareholders and managers is the 
fraction of shares owned by managers. In Google case it is 4% (see Table 2) that is 
much smaller than for example in Microsoft case. At the same the total number of 
shareholders is quite large. It appears that Googles use partial ownership in terms of 
involvement of employees in shareholdings as a tool to motivate personnel to perform 
efficiently instead of external pressure by creditors. Although by issuing shares Google 
might be sharing ownership with different groups of people, but it is avoiding the risk 
to let go company’s control in few hands. The conflict between creditors and 
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shareholders is not likely to happen because Google has less concern for creditors issue 
as it has less debt. According to the Google policy, the board of directors has an 
obligation to Monitor and Manage Potential Conflicts of Interest. The Board will also 
ensure that there is no abuse of corporate assets or unlawful related party transactions. 
One of the reasons why Google wanted to go public rather than using debt could be to 
have fewer conflicts between company and outsiders. 
Table 2. Information about Google. 
Equity  GOOG 
Market Cap (Mln.) 285,019 
# of Institution Owners 2,800 
# of Fund Owners 4,574 
% Owned by Institutions 72.63 
% Owned by Funds 38.47 
% Owned by Insiders 0.04 
 
    As the flexibility theory and life cycle theory propose it is not beneficial for new 
firms to use debt financing, they rely more on equity to make their operations smooth 
at early stage of their existence so they are considered more flexible. Google expansion 
and growth business approach requires a lot of funds. Google historically pays cash for 
acquisition and expansion (except YouTube deal). The initial public offering in August 
of 2004 raised $1,161.1M to help the company growth. The performance of Google 
while using equity as core source of financing became better since 2004. In 2004 
Google has 170, 601 shares valued at $34M and in 2005, Google acquired nine 
companies and all of the assets of another six other companies for a total amount of 
$130.5M of cash. Google continued with the acquisition of YouTube in 2008, AdMob 
in 2010, Zagat in 2011, Motorola Mobility in 2012 and Waze in 2013.  
    According to life cycle theory for growing and mature firms it is more likely to 
have higher leverage ratio which would result in low flexibility. It is opposite in 
Google’s case as it does not use a lot of debt. The Debt/equity ratio for Google in 2004 
was higher than in 2013.  
   The signaling theory states that from the investors’ perspective, the market reaction 
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on issuance of debt is neutral and of equity is negative.  In Google’s case, the issuance 
of shares at different stages made it successful and profitable so it’s a different outcome 
of the signaling theory.  
http://www.linkedin.com/today/post/article/20130913153717-7298-when-google-went-public 
 
5.2. Yahoo! Inc.  
Table 3. Results from Yahoo Analysis 2013 
  
D/(D+E) 
Ratio 
Beta for 
the  
Stock  
Cost of 
Equity    
Cost of 
Debt  WACC % 
Market Value of 
Firm   
Current 
capital 
structure 6.30% 0.92 8.33% 1.04% 7.87 39369059976  
Optimal 
capital 
structure 25.00% 1.07 9.41% 2.14% 7.59 40814194602  
Change 18.70% 0.15 1.08% 1.10% 0.28 
 
1445134,626 
 
Yahoo first appeared online in 1994 while the company’s founders, David Filo and 
Jerry Yang, were still students at university. The Company was later incorporated in 
March 1995 and completed its initial public offering on April 12 1996. Yahoo is the 
second largest firm in the internet information providers industry and is the main rival 
of the industry leader Google. Yahoo currently is a highly profitable and established 
company.  
    The big internet companies like Yahoo started life conservatively, preferring to 
avoid debt and use the enormous amount of free cash flow that their businesses throw 
off every year to grow their businesses. 
1. Is Yahoo’s current debt/equity ratio high or low?  
Yahoo! Inc.’s debt/equity ratio is low. Yahoo! Inc. currently has a debt/equity 
ratio of 6.3% and their optimal ratio is around 25%. Google has a debt/equity ratio 
of 4.02% and Microsoft has 20.24%.  
2. Is Yahoo’s current debt/equity ratio explained by the firm’s financial policy or by the 
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current market conditions? 
     Yahoo’s debt/equity is affected by both their policy and market conditions. 
Between 2004-2010 Yahoo’s debt/equity ratio was relatively stable though economic 
conditions were significantly changing. This suggests that Yahoo’s debt/equity ratio is 
affected by its financial policy. The last time Yahoo! Inc. had a significantly higher 
debt/equity ratio was in 2003-2004. Around that time internet companies were 
recovering from the dot-com bubble bursting. So it is reasonable for a company to have 
a shortage of funds and to use debt to stay afloat. Also it appears that Yahoo! Inc. was 
competing heavily with Google at that time and acquired a few companies in order to 
improve their services. Also as the economy was recovering from 2010 onward the 
debt/equity ratio has had a slight downward trend. This suggests that debt/equity ratio 
is also affected by market conditions. As the economy improves, companies’ earnings 
typically increase and debt/equity ratio decreases.  
3. Optimal capital structure analysis. 
    As was mentioned above Yahoo! Inc. is underleveraged. There are many 
factors that are not taken into consideration in the spreadsheet that will affect the capital 
structure policy of the firm. Factors such as comparative firms, control problems, life 
cycle, and debt & discipline theory do not explain Yahoo! Inc.’s capital structure. Most 
of firms in related industries have a higher debt/equity ratio than Yahoo! Inc. In terms 
of life cycle Yahoo is a mature firm and is not so risky anymore and therefore could 
have higher debt.  The debt and discipline theory could work because most of Yahoo! 
Inc. shareholders are outsiders unlike Microsoft. Nevertheless, Yahoo! Inc. has very 
low debt and it is clear they are not using debt to stimulate their managers. Managers 
in the firm seem to be adequately responsive to Yahoo stockholders. The firm set up 
and email alert system, which gives investors alerts and instant access to all the 
company’s financial information and events. Upon signing up for these alerts, investors 
will be notified when any important press releases are made public, all SEC filings, 
including quarterly and annual reports and large insider transactions, and any webcasts 
or events that Yahoo holds such as financial conferences and stockholder’s meetings. 
Yahoo also allows investors the ability to sign up to have all SEC filings, such as the 
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10-K, annual reports and Proxy statements printed and mailed to their household so 
they have hardcopies of the information.   
However, factors like intangible assets, flexibility, and pecking-order theory can 
help to explain Yahoo’s policy. Since a good portion of Yahoo! Inc.’s assets are 
intangible it has a higher risk and higher bankruptcy costs. The company should not 
have as much debt as other companies with more tangible assets. This could be one 
reason that explains Yahoo! Inc.’s lower than optimal debt/equity ratio.  Also Yahoo 
has made good investments in the past, which was only possible because of the 
flexibility the company had. Yahoo! Inc. has bought and resold several companies. One 
of the most recent and successful investment projects was the investment in Alababa 
Group.  
The pecking-order theory could explain why it does not have much debt. 
According to the pecking-order theory managers prefer to use internal funds to finance 
investments if possible over debt and equity. Therefore if the company had enough 
internal funds to support its investments it never had much need for debt. 
  Yahoo has other deductions to reduce the tax bite. The main one being 
depreciation of $481M. This might be another reason as to why Yahoo! Inc. has decided 
to not take so much debt. The depreciation definitely helps to soften the effect of taxes. 
Following the trade-off theory Yahoo! Inc. might believe that their tax shield is 
sufficient and their risk of bankruptcy is too costly and outweighs the use of more debt.      
   How easy is it for bondholders to observe what equity investors are doing? Are the 
assets tangible or intangible? If not, what are the costs in terms of monitoring 
stockholders or in terms of bond covenants? 
 It is relatively easy for bondholders to observe what equity investors are doing 
because the information is easily found in the 10-K and the other quarterly reports. The 
firm has both tangible and intangible assets. According to the company’s balance sheet, 
goodwill and intangible assets account for $5,132,210,000 of their total 
$14,905,795,000 worth of assets so there is a fairly even breakdown of intangible and 
tangible assets. Throughout 2012, Yahoo continued to purchase more intangible assets, 
such as intellectual property rights and developed technology, which saw amortization 
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expenses for the company rise 7% compared to the year before.  
    How well can this firm forecast its future investment opportunities and needs? How 
much does it value flexibility? 
 The firm values flexibility very much. As recently as the end of the third quarter of 
2013, Yahoo generated free cash flow of $249 million and returned an additional $1.7 
billion to shareholders through buybacks. Their balance sheet had $3.2 billion in cash 
and securities, which made them well positioned with ample liquidity to fund future 
investments for growth. Yahoo has more than $4.5 billion dollars of long-term 
investments alone according to their balance sheet for the end of quarter three. With 
more than $3.2 billion in cash and securities, they have a lot of financial flexibility 
should any good opportunities arise for them to make smart investments regarding their 
future.  
4. Recommendations regarding firm’s capital structure. 
 The main recommendation regarding the firm’s capital structure is to add more 
debt. Following the idea that debt does indeed add discipline to a company and to the 
company’s managers, Yahoo has room to add more debt and still be able to deal with it 
comfortably, while it gives them incentive to work harder, invest smarter and grow more 
rapidly in the future. Looking at Yahoo’s total debt of roughly $121,000,000 and 
comparing that to companies in the same industry, such as Microsoft and Google, who 
have debts of $16 billion and $7 billion dollars respectively, Yahoo’s debt is far less 
than both of them. From seeing the rapid growth of Google into one of the largest 
companies in the world, with a stock price of over $1,000, Yahoo may want to look into 
a larger debt as that may be one of the reasons why Google is growing at such a rapid 
pace and why their stock prices have skyrocketed in recent times. 
Of course there would be negative results that come from raising the debt as 
well (especially if debt is raised by too much), such as higher risk of bankruptcy (higher 
bankruptcy costs), less flexibility. In addition, too much debt could lead to problems 
like debt overhang. All considered it appears that the benefits outweigh the risks and 
Yahoo! Inc. needs to use more debt as part of the capital structure. 
5.3. Look Smart. 
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Table 4. Results for LookSmart.  
  
D/(D+E) 
Ratio 
Beta for the  
Stock  
Cost of 
Equity    
Cost of 
Debt  WACC 
Market Value of 
Firm (mln)  
              
Current 
capital 
structure 22.02% 0.84 9.03% 13.53% 10.02% 18  
Optimal 
capital 
structure 0.00% 0.66  7.13% 3.27% 7.13% 25  
Change -22.02% -0.18 -1.90% -10.26% -2.89% $7  
 
LookSmart, Ltd. (“LookSmart” or the “Company”) is a search and display advertising 
network solutions company that provides relevant solutions for search and display 
advertising customers. LookSmart was organized in 1996 and is incorporated in the 
State of Delaware 
  In December 1997, the Company approved the 1998 Stock Option Plan (the “Plan”). 
In June 2007, the stockholders approved the LookSmart 2007 Equity Incentive Plan 
(the “2007 Plan”). Under the 2007 Plan, the Company may grant incentive stock options, 
nonqualified stock options, stock appreciation rights and stock rights to employees, 
directors and consultants. Share-based incentive awards are provided under the terms 
of these two plans. 
   The Company’s Plans are administered by the Compensation Committee of the 
Board of Directors. Awards under the Plans principally include at-the-money options 
and fully vested restricted stock. Outstanding stock options generally become 
exercisable over a four year period from the grant date and have a term of seven years. 
Grants can only be made under the 2007 Plan. The 1998 Plan is closed to further share 
issuance. The number of shares reserved for issuance under the Plans was 4.1 million 
and 4.3 million shares of common stock for the years ended December 31, 2012 and 
2011, respectively. There were 1.9 million shares available to be granted under the 2007 
Plan at December 31, 2012. At the same time, the company doesn’t have long time debt.  
    Like other small firms LookSmart is “damaged” in that they are struggling to 
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survive. LookSmart is plagued with cutbacks, legal actions and loss of their consumer 
base which lower revenues and increase expenses. This company is very high in risk 
and has very little support from potential investors and creditors. These companies have 
little access to loans and have exhausted their equity opportunities and must survive 
through private placements which are low in cost and custom-designed for the company. 
5.4. Rediff.com 
Table 5. Results for Rediff.com 
  
D/(D+E) 
Ratio 
Beta for the  
Stock  Cost of Equity    Cost of Debt  WACC 
Market Value 
of Firm (mln.)  
              
Current 
capital 
structure 1.42% 4.85 50.58% 13.71% 50.05% 102  
Optimal 
capital 
structure 0.00% 4.78  49.86% 3.32% 49.86% 102  
Change -1.42% -0.07 -0.72% -10.39% -0.19% $0  
 
For small business in international information provider industry, Rediff debt/equity 
ratio is higher than optimal. It appears that small businesses almost do not have much 
profit, so they think they have to borrow funds. However, the tax advantage of debt is 
not as important as for a big firm. And comparing with debt financing, there are more 
advantage in equity financing like less bankruptcy cost, less agency cost, more 
financing flexibility. 
   In fact, revenue of many small companies in international information provider 
industry is not enough to pay for his financing cost. In my opinion, it is very important 
to make sure that you can earn enough money to pay for your financing payment. 
5.5. Some other observations    
  Small companies such as Paid, Move and Dynamic Leisure use different capital 
structures. Paid, Inc. engaged in multiple long-term convertible notes to help fund the 
development and launch of a new service which will provide them enough revenue so 
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they need not outsource for future financing. Move uses long-term debt for long-term 
capital leases and Dynamic Leisure Corp. was bought out by another company which 
took out a long-term loan shortly after to fund a growth-through-acquisition strategy. 
All three companies struggle to earn profits or have none at all which makes risky 
companies that do not benefit by the trade-off associated with debt financing. Creditors 
are in the business to make money from lending theirs and are not interested in making 
risky or faulty investments. Debt-financing opportunities for Paid, Move and Dynamic 
are limited and costly and may hinder their future operations through putting strains on 
cash flows and restricting investments.    
  It can be observed that many of these small companies in their infancy stages are 
undergoing rapid growth and with it, large losses as all funds are being tunneled into 
investments and development. These companies bankruptcy costs outweigh tax benefits 
for potential loans the debt will be associated with high interest rates and restrictive 
covenants to protect the creditors. Secondly, a small number of the firms are “damaged” 
in that they are struggling to survive. Some of these companies such as LookSmart are 
plagued with cutbacks, legal actions and loss of their consumer base which lower 
revenues and increase expenses. Aptimus and others suffered during the tech crash of 
early 2000 which diminished the value high expectations for some of the firms. These 
companies are very high in risk and have very little support from potential investors 
and creditors. These companies have little access to loans and have exhausted their 
equity opportunities and must survive through private placements which are low in cost 
and custom-designed for the company.     
  
7. Summary of Analysis and Recommendations 
1. Our analysis shows that most large companies in the Internet industry are 
underleveraged. Low debt ratio is hurting the companies’ profitability.  In recent years 
some companies began to realize that using tax shields can be beneficial. However, they 
use other ideas than debt tax shield. Google, for instance, has been paying taxes in 
countries with lower tax rates for last 4 years. It appears that one of the reasons why 
managers do not use debt tax shield is that they think that the capital cost of using 
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internal funds is lower than issue debt.  Based on this view, managers will overuse the 
internal funds.  For those companies, our recommendation will be issue more debt to 
increase the companies’ profitability.  There are also some natural reasons for not 
using debt. These may include agency cost of debt and loss of flexibility. However, 
many companies are underleveraged even taking other factors into consideration. 
2. Most small companies in the Internet industry are overleveraged. So they should have 
less debt. For some small companies, the cost of issuing new equity is naturally very 
high (asymmetric information problems). However, many companies underestimate 
long-term problems of carrying too much debt mostly flexibility loss. A possible 
solution would be using more preferred stocks. 
3. Third, internet companies can use international financing more efficiently. 
International debt has advantages not just for governments but for corporations and 
individuals as well. Corporations can raise international debt in different currencies. 
The currency differential does not just diversify risk; it helps to shop for lower interest 
rates in a limitless international market. Rates in international markets are normally 
lower than domestic sources of capital. This is largely because there are many major 
firms and banks involved in these transactions, creating an inherent stability in the 
market. In addition, given the fact that there are many currencies involved in many 
transactions, the overall risk is lower to the lending institution, since any fluctuations 
in the currencies and the local markets are balanced out by the others. Also international 
market have greater flexibility. International capital markets like euro-currency are 
under no capitalization restrictions. This means there are no required reserves for all 
institutions to maintain to cushion their risk. As a result, these markets can lend 100 
percent of their deposits, which is possible given the lack of risk in comparison to purely 
domestic institutions. Given the fact that international trade continues to grow, 
international markets continue to appear as a good bet to hedge against the possibility 
of local currency appreciation or market recessions. Finally, access to global capital 
markets can allow a firm to reduce its cost of capital. Companies seek a lower cost of 
capital through mergers and acquisitions, foreign direct investment, and other global 
activities. A competitive cost of capital depends on firm-specific characteristics that 
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attract international portfolio investors and the liberalization of markets where 
companies have the freedom to source capital in liquid markets. 
4. Using one theory cannot explain all capital structure strategies of Internet 
industry companies. Multiple theories should be used to explain the capital structure in 
this industry. One of findings of our research is that the optimal capital structure 
determined by the trade-off theory (spreadsheet analysis) usually differs from the actual 
financing mix that has observed in the industry. The pecking order theory can explain 
why small firms with no large cash reserves prefer debt to equity and why well-
established and financially healthy firms do not use external financing. It fails to 
explain, however, why most companies (especially young and/or growing companies 
with large expansionary expenditures) prefer large equity issues to bond issues or even 
other types of debt. Signaling theory of capital structure cannot explain why most 
internet firms do not use debt as a signal of firm quality. The market timing hypothesis 
provides good explanations for timing of firms IPOs. For example, nearly all companies 
issue equity through public offerings at opportune times, most notably during the “tech 
craze” or “dot.com bubble” of the late 1990s. One can see that firms undergo public 
offerings when the market has recovered from the tech crash of 2000 or at other times 
when management feels their stock is overvalued. Companies make stock repurchases 
at windows of opportunities where they believe their stock is undervalued. However, 
from a broader point of view, the market timing theory is limited in explaining firm’s 
capital structure besides IPO decision.  
5. Flexibility is underexplored area. Both equity and debt holders do place value on 
flexibility, especially in the recent years of turmoil in capital markets. Managers’ 
surveys show that managers value flexibility when choosing their capital structures. 
Therefore, new quantitative approaches in valuing flexibility should be developed. 
Managers are also concerned about credit ratings, as observed anecdotally in the press 
and through survey results. Future capital structure research would benefit from 
including credit ratings as part of the capital structure framework, to obtain a more 
comprehensive depiction of capital structure behavior. 
6. Traditional Theories have a lot of room for improvement. The pecking order theory 
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cannot explain why many firms in internet industry do not prefer debt over equity. 
Recent papers about dynamic pecking order theory are promising where managers may 
sometime find attractive to issue equity (see, for example, Miglo (2007, 2012b)). Next, 
one needs to develop Dynamic versions of Trade-Off Theory of Capital structure. 
Constructing models that recognize the role of time requires specifying a number of 
aspects that are typically ignored in a single-period model. Of particular importance are 
the roles of expectations and adjustment costs.  
  In the future, financial economists need to continue developing dynamic versions of 
each theory or to develop new models that incorporate both trade-off and pecking order 
ideas. More research may be required to create new models that can compete with trade-
off and pecking order theories.   
7. Finally, a popular line of inquiry based on surveys of managers about their capital 
structure decisions seems to be promising. For example, Graham and Harvey (2001) 
report a large gap between theory and practice. 
8. In terms of debate about future development of capital structure theory, the opinion 
of Harris and Raviv (1991) that asymmetric information theories are less promising 
seems to be questionable. Moreover, existing asymmetric information theories are not 
sufficient and this is the reason why these theories have less support than the trade-off 
theory among managers and students (Miglo, 2012a). However, asymmetric 
information is important in explaining many patterns of capital structure behavior of 
internet companies but managers do not have a practical tool to use it more efficiently. 
At the same time given that the gap between theory and practice is very large, we agree 
with Harris and Raviv (1991) opinion in that the door is still widely open for a new 
theory of capital structure.  
 
Other related issues 
1. Financial analysis of internet companies 
Capital structure analysis is only a part (although a very important part) of firm’s 
financial analysis. Surprisingly enough we have not found enough articles or case study 
analysis related to financial analysis of internet companies. So it appears that this 
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direction is interesting for future research. In early 2000s a number of research related 
to financial analysis of internet companies was published which was mostly related to 
internet bubble of 1999, internet companies valuation etc. Current analysis would 
probably be focused with accessing the success factors of internet companies given that 
they have been doing quite well in recent years. 
   A closely related area to capital structure is the area of financing ideas and financing 
innovations. In early 2000s a popular topic was IPOs by internet companies. It seems 
like now a peer-to-peer financing becomes quite popular.9  Our research is related 
because growing amounts of peer-to-peer financing can explain high debt/equity ratios 
for small companies. 
2. Combining financial and non-financial analysis of internet companies. 
Capital structure is one of those financial topics which is closely related to other aspects 
of firms’ activities such investments, production, strategic management, human 
resources management including agency problems etc. The case studies looking at 
different aspects of internet companies and their connections to capital structure 
policies are an interesting line for future research. 
3. Educational research.  
The topic of capital structure is a very interesting and important topic for conducting 
research in education area. It is not only related to the capital structure education itself, 
but also to general business education. Since capital structure is well connected with 
other areas of business, incorporating this in business classes and advanced business 
classes can be an interesting program. As a result, research is vital to see the result of 
this practice. For an example, see Miglo (2012a). 
 
                         8. Conclusions 
This project analyzes the financing decisions and capital structure of Internet companies 
and relates observed findings to the common capital structure theories. Large Internet 
companies usually have low debt and small internet companies have high debt. It would 
                                                             
9 See, for example, Lin, Prabhala, and Viswanathan (2009). 
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appear that the trade-off theory of capital structure, pecking order theory, market-timing 
theory, and other theories cannot individually determine a firm’s capital structure and 
their use of sources of financing accurately but can compliment each other to help 
explain observed behavior. Our team also suggests a number of recommendations for 
capital structure theory and practice.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1. The list of companies 
 
 Company Ticker Long-Term 
Debt (in $US 
thousands) 
Market 
Capitalization (in 
$US millions) 
1 Accelerize New Media, lnc. ACLZ 480.31 26.2 
2 Akamai Technologies, lnc. AKAM 0 6600 
3 Ancestry.com lnc. ACOM 0 1300 
4 AOL lnc. AOL 108400 3400 
5 Atrinsic, lnc. ATRNQ 4020 16.6 
6 Autobytel lnc. ABTL 500 34.9 
7 Baidu, lnc. BIDU 452980 39500 
8 Bankrate, lnc. RATE 193770 1100 
9 Biozone Pharmaceuticals, lnc. BZNE 5530 104.7 
10 Bitauto Holdings Limited BITA 0 197.2 
11 Blucora, lnc. BCOR 74580 714.4 
12 CafePress lnc. PRSS 2940 97.2 
13 China Finance Online Co., Ltd JRJC 21140 27.5 
14 ChinaCache International Holdi CCIH 272.72 109.9 
15 Ediets.com lnc.  DIET 1010 18.9 
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16 Facebook, lnc. FB 706000 40700 
17 Firefish, lnc. FRFS 53.85 N/A 
18 FrogAds, lnc. FROG 361.87 N/A 
19 Global Sources Ltd. GSOL 0 188.6 
20 Google lnc. GOOG 7890000 223500 
21 Groupon, lnc. GRPN 0 3200 
22 Healthstream lnc. HSTM 0 742.3 
23 HomeAway, lnc. AWAY 0 2100 
24 IAC/InterActiveCorp IACI 95840 4600 
25 Immediatek lnc. IMKI 5.7 24.6 
26 Internet Media Services, lnc. ITMV 570.67 0.2 
27 Interxion Holding NV INXN 333700 1500 
28 Jiayuan.com International Ltd. DATE 0 197.1 
29 Kayak Software Corporation  KYAK 0 1200 
30 Kiwibox.Com, lnc. KIWB 8860 6.8 
31 Linkedln Corporation LNKD 0 11300 
32 LiveDeal, lnc. LIVE 129.94 9.2 
33 Local Corporation LOCM 8000 59.4 
34 LookSmart, Ltd. LOOK 313 14 
35 Medient Studios, lnc. MDNT 3.5 1.8 
36 MeetMe, lnc. MEET 11880 147.3 
37 Mister Goody, lnc. MSGO 0 9 
38 MMRGlobal, lnc. MMRF 3440 8.7 
39 Monster Offers MONT 49.5 6.3 
40 Move, lnc. MOVE 0 319.2 
41 Net Savings Link, lnc. NSAV 222.34 N/A 
42 OpenTable, lnc. OPEN 0 985.2 
43 Options Media Group Holdings OPMG 1220 2.1 
44 PeopleString Corporation PLPE 0 0.8 
45 Phoenix New Media Limited FENG 0 288.3 
46 Reach Messaging Holdings, lnc. RCMH 264.87 N/A 
47 Rediff.com India Limited REDF 0 109 
48 Remark Media, lnc. MARK 464.21 10.2 
49 Renren lnc. RENN 0 1300 
50 Shutterfly, lnc. SFLY 0 1100 
51 Sohu.com lnc. SOHO 0 1500 
52 SouFun Holdings Ltd. SFUN 270570 1400 
53 SpectrumDNA, lnc. SPXA 9.09 0.7 
54 Subaye, lnc. SBAY 0 N/A 
55 SurePure, lnc. SURP 0 40.6 
56 Synacor, lnc. SYNC 5140 165.4 
57 Sync2 Networks Corp SYNW 807.98 N/A 
58 TechTarget, lnc. TTGT 0 199 
59 Theglobe.com lnc. TGLO 500 N/A 
60 TheStreet, lnc. TST 0 51.6 
61 Travelzoo lnc. TZOO 0 286.5 
62 TripAdvisor lnc. TRIP 414360 4300 
63 Tucows lnc. TCX 4000 53.7 
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64 Vacation Home Swap, lnc. VCHS 35.73 2.06 
65 ValueClick, lnc. VCLK 172500 1200 
66 Web.com Group, lnc. WWWW 694780 817.7 
67 WebXU, lnc. WBXU 2310 7.1 
68 Yahoo! Lnc. YHOO 39000 18760 
69 Yelp, lnc. YELP 0 1500 
70 Youku Tudou lnc. YOKU 2070 2300 
71 Zynga, lnc. ZNGA 100000 1800 
 
Appendix 2. Input data (example). 
   
Earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation  $1,756.00  
Depreciation and Amortization $323.00  
Number of shares outstanding  1,080,000,000  
Market price per share $0.0000263400  
Beta of the stock 1.70 
Book value of debt $1,432.00  
The market value of debt $1,432.00  
Do you have any operating leases? Yes 
Current long-term government bond rate 2.78% 
Short-term interest rate 1.80% 
Risk premium  11.90% 
Country default spread  0.00% 
  
 
 
 
Appendix 3. Lease obligations (example) 
 
Inputs         
Operating lease expense in current 
year        $537.00  
Operating Lease Commitments          
Year Commitment      
1  $    540.00        
2  $    406.00        
3  $    242.00        
4  $    130.00        
5  $    117.00        
6 and beyond  $    395.00        
          
Output         
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Year Commitment Present Value     
1  $    540.00  $540.00      
2  $    406.00  $406.00      
3  $    242.00  $242.00      
4  $    130.00  $130.00      
5  $    117.00  $117.00      
6 and beyond  $    395.00  $146.30      
Debt Value of leases =    $ 1,581.30      
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4. Debt Analysis (example) 
 
Bank medium-term debt 899 899 
Bank long-term debt 398 398 
Bonds 0 0 
Unsecured debentures and 
notes 0 0 
Senior debt securities 0 0 
Senior medium-term notes 0 0 
Subordinated medium-term 
notes 0 0 
Other notes 135 135 
Total 1432 1432 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5. Tax rate (example) 
 
Facebook’s TAX RATE  
Quarter 2012/9/29 2012/6/30 2012/3/30 
Earnings before tax -383 382 520 
Provision for taxes 48 177 218 
Tax rate -12.53% 46.34% 41.92% 
Average tax rate, TC 25.24%     
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Appendix 6. Calculations (example) 
 
Table 4               
D/(D+E) D/E Debt Beta Cost of Equity 
Operating 
Inc. Depreciation Interests 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00 1.57 20.50% $1,756  $323  $0  
5.00% 5.26% 1561.63 1.63 21.23% $1,756  $323  $52  
10.00% 11.11% 3154.76 1.70 22.05% $1,756  $323  $104  
15.00% 17.65% 4780.35 1.78 22.96% $1,756  $323  $158  
20.00% 25.00% 6439.40 1.86 23.99% $1,756  $323  $213  
25.00% 33.33% 8132.96 1.96 25.16% $1,756  $323  $268  
30.00% 42.86% 9816.45 2.07 26.49% $1,756  $323  $363  
35.00% 53.85% 11517.44 2.20 28.02% $1,756  $323  $461  
40.00% 66.67% 13232.66 2.35 29.82% $1,756  $323  $562  
45.00% 81.82% 14951.52 2.53 31.93% $1,756  $323  $673  
50.00% 100.00% 16587.48 2.75 34.48% $1,756  $323  $829  
55.00% 122.22% 18380.03 3.01 37.58% $1,756  $323  $919  
60.00% 150.00% 19961.29 3.33 41.47% $1,756  $323  $1,098  
65.00% 185.71% 21762.25 3.75 46.46% $1,756  $323  $1,197  
70.00% 233.33% 23262.71 4.31 53.11% $1,756  $323  $1,396  
75.00% 300.00% 24338.67 5.10 62.43% $1,756  $323  $1,704  
80.00% 400.00% 26047.03 6.27 76.41% $1,756  $323  $1,823  
85.00% 566.67% 26886.25 8.23 99.71% $1,756  $323  $2,151  
90.00% 900.00% 27578.94 12.14 146.30% $1,756  $323  $2,482  
95.00% 1900.00% 29096.43 23.89 286.08% $1,756  $323  $2,619  
5. MAIN RESULTS 
Table 5               
  
D/(D+E) 
Ratio   
Beta for the  
Stock  Cost of Equity    Cost of Debt    WACC 
                
Current 
capital 
structure 9.88%   1.70 22.03% 2.30%   20.08% 
Optimal 
capital 
structure 65.00%   3.75 46.46% 4.11%   18.93% 
Change 55.12%   2.05 24.43% 1.81%   -1.15% 
 
